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COMMENT
GONZALES V. OREGON AND THE FUTURE
OF AGENCY-MADE CRIMINAL LAW
TREVOR STILES*
In 1994, Oregon voters passed Ballot Measure 16, which legalized
physician-assisted suicide in limited cases. Seven years later, Attorney
GeneralJohn Ashcroft issued an interpretive rule that criminalized assisted
suicide using drugs covered under the Controlled Substances Act. The
Supreme Court heard the case Gonzales v. Oregon and ruled in favor of
Oregon. In so doing, the Court held that the Attorney General had no
authority to create regulations that would preempt and criminalize areas
traditionallyreserved to the states, such as medicine. This ruling contrasts
with Gonzales v. Raich, decided less than a year before, in which the Court
upheld the Attorney General's ability to preempt state law to enforce
provisions of the Controlled Substances Act as it applied to medical
marijuana. Most scholars have attempted to reconcile the holdings in
Oregon and Raich by focusing on the federalism doctrine. This Comment,
however, argues that the explanationfor the discrepancy lies in a synthesis
offederalism and administrativelaw. This synthesized reading implicates
actions taken by the Department of Justice as it attempts to apply the
provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizationsstatute to
the prosecutionof the War on Terror.
I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, right-to-life issues have been thrust on the
American political scene in ever-increasing fashion.' For months at a time,
* J.D., Northwestern University School of Law. The author thanks Professor Charlton
Copeland for his invaluable suggestions and corrections. The author also thanks his wife,
Pamela Stiles, for her proofreading, editing, encouragement, and support.
1Any discussion of the right-to-life debate in contemporary America necessarily
encompasses the related right-to-death issues. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 735 (1997) ("Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the
morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide."). The Court's decision in
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one could hardly pick up a newspaper or turn on a television without being
bombarded by media images stressing the importance of the right-to-life
debate. Arguments over these matters have become increasingly caustic
and political, spilling over into fresh battlegrounds both in the legislative
and judicial branches. The Terri Schiavo saga best highlights the spillover
of the right-to-life movement into politics. 2 When her husband attempted to
remove the vegetative Ms. Schiavo from life support, activists on both sides
of the debate entered into a grueling three-year campaign to settle the issue
both by utilizing the court system and by pressuring politicians on the state
and national level to intervene. 3
With right-to-life and right-to-death issues preeminent on the national
political scene, the Supreme Court decided Gonzales v. Oregon,4 a case rife
with these concerns. Oregon was a challenge to the Attorney General's
Interpretive Rule of the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA").5 The Attorney
General attempted to assert his authority under the CSA to criminalize the
use of drugs in physician-assisted suicide. The Supreme Court sided with
the State of Oregon 6 and affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling 7 that the CSA
does not empower the Attorney General to prohibit doctors from
prescribing regulated drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide when state
law permits such use. 8
Since the Supreme Court delivered its opinion, most scholars who
wrote about Oregon focused on its impact on federalism. 9 These scholars
Glucksberg sets the stage for Gonzales v. Oregon by leaving these decisions up to state
government.
2 Michael Shelden, "Her soul had gone, her body was ready" Pope and President
opposed him, but after a 15-year battle Michael Schiavo was able to let his wife Terri die,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Oct. 30, 2006, at 19 ("It was so political, you could smell
it ....All of a sudden, Jeb Bush sees the chance to win votes from Catholics and others by
making my life his business.... [W]hen he couldn't stop it in Florida, he turned to
Washington.").
3 See Patrick Kampert & Michael Martinez, Florida Rushes Law to Place Woman Back
on Life Support; Gov. Bush Orders Nutrients Resumed for Comatose Terri Schiavo, CHI.
TRuB., Oct. 22, 2003, at C1.
4 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
' 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000).
6 Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the 6-3 majority.
7 Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004).
8 Oregon, 546 U.S. at 274-75. Justices Roberts and Thomas joined Justice Scalia's
dissent. Justice Thomas wrote an additional dissent of his own, focusing on inconsistencies
between the decision in Oregon and the Court's previous ruling in Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1 (2005).
9 See, e.g., Annie Danino, Dodging the Issue of Physician Assisted Suicide: The Supreme
Court's Likely Response in Gonzales v. Oregon, 10 J.MED. & L. 299, 303 (2006) (noting
that one possible way the Court could decide would be by "evaluat[ing] whether the
Attorney General violated federalism principles by usurping both Oregon's ability to govern
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echo Justice Thomas's dissent because they view Oregon in light of
Gonzales v. Raich, which focused on Commerce Clause federalism.' 0
Accordingly, they argue that the Court's reasoning depends on subtle twists
of federalism doctrine to maintain consistency between the two opinions."
Many attempts have been made to explain how federalism concerns
drove the Court's reasoning.' 2 While federalism certainly played a role in
deciding Oregon, this Comment will show that the decision gains more
clarity when read as the Court's attempt to integrate the administrative law
doctrines laid down in United States v. Mead Corp.' 3 and Chevron USA,
Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc.14 This integration provides
guidelines for the powers of the Attorney General, particularly as they apply
to agency-made criminal law and regulatory preemption.
Reading Oregon as a synthesis of administrative law and federalism
doctrines has many potential implications. This Comment will draw out the
implications of this administrative law and federalism amalgam for an
important arena of agency-made criminal law. In particular, this Comment
will evaluate Oregon's impact on agency enforcement of Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") 15 statute provisions as they
affect the prosecution of terrorists in the United States. A synthesized
reading of Oregon impacts the Attorney General's ability to utilize
expansive criminal powers outside the textual bounds of RICO. 1 6 The
its medical procedures and the wishes of the Oregon electorate"); Melvyn R. Durchslag, The
Inevitability (and Desirability?) of Avoidance: A Response to Dean Kloppenberg, 56 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1043, 1054-55 (2006) (discussing judicial avoidance of the primary
federalism and constitutional issues in Oregon); Wilson Ray Huhn, The Constitutional
Jurisprudence of Sandra Day O'Connor: A Refusal to "Foreclose the Unanticipated," 39
AKRON L. REV. 373, 413-14 (2006) (noting that Raich and Oregon were decided on
federalism grounds); Ilya Somin, A FalseDawn for Federalism: Clear Statement Rules After
Gonzales v. Raich, 2005-2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 113 (evaluating federalism challenges to
federal regulatory authority); Ilya Somin, Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of
the War on Drugs, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 507 (arguing that Oregon does not
mitigate Raich's stance on federalism).
10 545 U.S. at 1.
1 See infra Part III; see also, e.g., Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States:
Federalism and Constitutional Rights, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745 (2004) (providing an
explanation for the federalism rulings of the recent Court).
12 See, e.g., Danino, supra note 9, at 2. This focus on federalism is understandable given
the prominence of federalism issues in the Rehnquist Court era.
13 533 U.S. 218 (2001).

14 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
See Irvin B. Nathan & Kenneth I. Juster, Law Enforcement Against International
Terrorists: Use of the RICO Statute, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 553, 560-65 (1989) (noting that
questions exist concerning the Attorney General's authorization to utilize RICO in the
prosecution of the War on Terror).
15
16

1264

TREVOR STILES

[Vol. 97

application of RICO to terrorism creates significant challenges under this
reading and may require Congress to delineate clearer boundaries to the
Attorney General for effective prosecution of the War on Terror.
Part II of this Comment provides a brief history of agency deference,
more closely examines the decisions in Oregon and Raich, and draws out
the apparent discrepancy among the Justices' voting patterns in those two
cases. 7 Part III more directly addresses whether Oregon is a decision
determined solely along federalism lines. This Part examines five
distinctions that could explain the Court's ruling: agency-made rules versus
Congress-made statutes, criminal penalties versus civil penalties, explicit
congressional approval versus congressional silence, economic versus noneconomic factors, and vanguard state versus laggard state approaches. 18
Part III shows that none of these approaches fully explains why the
Attorney General could criminalize behavior in Raich by using the CSA,
but not criminalize similar behavior in Oregon. Part IV proposes an
alternative reading by suggesting that the focus on federalism in Oregon
obscures the intricate questions of administrative law that drive the case. 19
Part V of this Comment exposes the challenges a hybrid
federalism/administrative law reading of Oregon creates for agencies that
attempt to utilize RICO in the War on Terror. z°
II. BACKGROUND
A. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DOCTRINES

Deference granted by courts to agencies has been in a state of flux over
the past several decades. For years, the Supreme Court utilized the
doctrines laid out in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB 2' and Skidmore v.
Swift & Co. 22 The landmark Chevron decision changed deference
considerably.23 Recently, the Supreme Court has begun to flesh out its
Chevron doctrine, incorporating much of the previous Skidmore regime.24

17 See infra Part II.
"SSee infra Part III.
'9 See infra Part IV.
20 See infra Part V.
21 340 U.S. 474 (1951); see infra text accompanying notes 25-29.
22 323 U.S. 134 (1944); see infra text accompanying notes 30-33.
23 See infra text accompanying notes 34-38.
24

See infra text accompanying notes 39-48.

2007]

AGENCY-MADE CRIMINAL LA W

1265

1. Pre-ChevronDeference
After the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") in
1946,25 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of judicial review of agency
action in 1951 with Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB. 26 In Universal
Camera Corp., the Court laid out a very deferential standard of review,
upholding agency action where "substantial evidence" 27 exists.
Additionally, Universal Camera Corp. requires courts to consider the
totality of the record.28
The substantial evidence standard provided
deference somewhere between that of the "jury standard" and the "clearly
29
erroneous standard.,
Skidmore v. Swift & Co. provided for lesser, persuasive deference in
certain cases.3 ° In Skidmore, plant employees appealed a decision of the
United States Department of Labor ("DOL") that would not require
payment for "on-call" time at their plant. 3' The Supreme Court noted that
while the DOL's decision did not bind courts, it did reflect "a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance. 32 This deference is such that "[t]he weight
of... a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control. 3 3 Under the Skidmore
paradigm, agency decisions that were not binding on courts were still
granted deference to the extent that they were persuasive.
2. The Rise of the Chevron Era
Judicial review in administrative law, however, revolves around
Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council.34 Moving away from
the multi-factor deference analysis applied in previous cases, the Chevron
Court outlined a two-step approach to determining deference: First, is there
an ambiguous statute?
Second, is the agency's construction of that
ambiguous statute reasonable? If a statute is silent or ambiguous with

25
26
27
28

Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
340 U.S. at 474.
"Substantial evidence" is defined as "more than a mere scintilla." Id. at 477.
Id. (citing Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
29 Id.
30 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
"' Id. at 135-36.
32 Id. at 140.
33 Id.

34 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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respect to the specific issue, the court must consider whether
the agency's
35
action was based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Chevron acts to achieve uniformity in federal law 36 and keep the courts
out of political questions.37
By deferring to reasonable agency
interpretations, courts
avoid
becoming
entangled in determinations of
38
preference.
policy
3. The Post-ChevronEra: Back to the Future?
United States v. Mead Corp.,39 decided in 2001, further refined the
Court's approach to judicial deference. In Mead, the Court held that before
applying Chevron, two questions must be answered in the affirmative.4 °
First, has Congress delegated power to the agency to make rules with the
35 Id. at 843. The requirements of Chevron Step One were fleshed out in Immigration &

NaturalizationService v. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. 421 (1987) (no deference to agency at
Step One); Rapaport v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 59 F.3d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (agency does
not administer statute unless it exclusively administers it); and Food & DrugAdministration
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (courts must consider the larger
regulatory scheme surrounding agency action). See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 845 (2001) ("[Ilf the legal question as to
which Congress is silent is 'extraordinary,' then this congressional silence should be
interpreted to mean that the agency is not entitled to mandatory deference.").
36 See generally Peter L. Strauss, One-Hundred-FiftyCases Per Year: Some Implications
of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 87 COLUM.
L. REv. 1093, 1118-29 (1987) (arguing that the Supreme Court defers to agencies to maintain
uniformity in federal law).
37 See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government.
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the
judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated
policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the
incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this
political branch of the Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing
interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday
realities.
See Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 821, 822-24 (1990) (discussing jurisprudential reasons for Chevron doctrine); Cass R.
Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2088 (1990)
("Chevron reflects a salutary understanding that these judgments of policy and principle
should be made by administrators rather than judges." (citing Silberman, supra note 37, at
822-24)).
38 See Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 515 (1989) (noting that one argument for Chevron is that it enables policy to
be shaped by the political process, rather than by the courts).
3' 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
40 Id. at 226-28.
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force of law? Second, has the agency, in fact, acted with such authority? 41
The Mead variations have been called Chevron Step Zero because they
determine the hurdles an agency must clear before being granted Chevron
deference.4 2 Oregon was the Court's first attempt to deal with regulatory
preemption since Mead.43
Auer v. Robbins44 provided for deference in situations where an agency
determines the ambiguities of its own substantive regulation via an
Interpretive Rule. In Auer, the plaintiff police officers sued their police
commissioner to recover overtime pay.45 The Secretary of Labor issued an
interpretation of the "salary-basis" test which determined that the police
officers were salaried and not eligible for overtime pay.46
On appeal, the Supreme Court stated that "[b]ecause Congress has not
directly spoken to the precise question at issue, we must sustain the
Secretary's approach so long as it is based on a permissible construction of
the statute. '47 That is, an agency's interpretation of its own statute should
be shown deference as long as it is a permissible construction of the
statute.48
Taken as a whole, the evolving Chevron/Mead line of cases outlines
some boundaries for the doctrine of judicial deference to agency action.
Courts show deference to agencies when those agencies interpret their own
statutes as long as the regulations promulgated by the agencies are enacted
within the scope of their delegated legislative power.

41 Id.
42

See generally Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187 (2006)

(providing the basic framework the Court uses to determine whether to apply the Chevron
test). In recent years, the Court has reaffirmed Skidmore as being relevant in agency
deference doctrine. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1998) (Skidmore
applies when Chevron does not apply); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257-58 (1991) (following pre-Chevron Skidmore analysis instead
of Chevron), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as
recognized in Landgraf v. Usi Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994).
43 For more background on the interplay between Chevron and regulatory preemption,
see generally Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice with Your Chevron? Presumption and Deference
in Regulatory Preemption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 823, 840 (1995); Damien J. Marshall,
Note, The Application of Chevron Deference in Regulatory Preemption Cases, 87 GEO. L.J.
263 (1998).
44 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
45 Id. at 454-55.
46 Id.

47 Id. at 457 (citations omitted).
48 This approach differs from an interpretation that does not have the force of law.
Examples of this include opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586-88 (2000);
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 35, at 845-48.
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B. GONZALES V.RAICH49
In 1996, California voters passed Proposition 215, which legalized the
use of marijuana for medical purposes. ° Proposition 215 directly
conflicted with federal law because the CSA listed marijuana as a Schedule
One drug, which prevented its use in any circumstance, even if deemed
medically necessary.5'
In October of 2002, Angel Raich, Diana Monson, and two anonymous
parties filed suit seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Those parties
claimed that the CSA impinged on their right to use medical marijuana
under state law.
This challenge to the CSA focused primarily on
Commerce Clause issues. The plaintiffs argued that homegrown marijuana
did not affect "[c]ommerce ...among the several States, ' '53 and thus the
CSA's prohibition against marijuana was outside
the scope of the
54
government.
federal
the
of
powers
Clause
Commerce
The Supreme Court applied rational basis review to the challenged
provisions. Specifically, the Supreme Court relied heavily on Wickard v.
Filburn,55 which established Congress's power to regulate purely intrastate
activity that is not commercial if Congress concludes that failure to regulate
that class of activity could affect the regulation of the entire interstate
market in that commodity. 6 In relying on Wickard, the Court gave
Congress the power to enforce comprehensive regulatory schemes such as
the CSA's prohibition against marijuana, even if doing so infringed on state
regulatory and criminal law spheres of influence. 7

4'545 U.S. 1 (2005).
50 Proposition 215 was later codified as the Compassionate Use Act of 1996, which
became effective November 6, 1996. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (2005).

See

generally DANIEL A. SMITH, EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE: THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT
DEMOCRACY ON CITIZENS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AMERICAN STATES (2004)

(providing background information about voter initiatives in the United States).
"' 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2000 & Supp. II).
52 Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
53U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
54Raich, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 922-23.
" 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

56 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 20-21 (2005).
57Id. at 22. This is notable largely because it enables Congress to infringe upon areas
traditionally regulated solely by the states. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Theoretical and
ConstitutionalIssues: Article: Enforcing FederalismAfter United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ.
L. REv. 793, 807 (1996) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576-77 (1995)):
Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state
concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries
between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would
become illusory. The resultant inability to hold either branch of the government answerable to

2007]

AGENCY-MADE CRIMINAL LA W

1269

Some scholars saw Raich as supporting agencies' ability to preempt
state criminal law. 58 The preemption in Raich is noteworthy because
Congress did not explicitly endorse it; Congress did not give the Attorney
General explicit permission to criminalize the use of marijuana under state
law. 59 Rather, via the CSA, Congress gave the Attorney General power to
control the regulation of drugs through a comprehensive scheme of
classification and categorization. Part of this regulatory scheme included
the preemption of state criminal law and regulations. Raich upheld the
Attorney General's regulatory preemption of state criminal law when
applying the CSA to the classification of drugs.
C. GONZALES V. OREGON6°
In 1994, Oregon voters passed Oregon Ballot Measure 16, which
legalized physician-assisted suicide61 and created the Oregon Death with
Dignity Act ("ODWDA"). 62 The measure passed with fifty-one percent of
the vote.63 According to the ODWDA, doctors could give a lethal dose of a
drug to patients who were expected to die within six months of an incurable
disease, as determined by two separate doctors.64 The ODWDA exempts
from civil or criminal liability state-licensed physicians who prescribe a
lethal dose of drugs when requested to do so by a terminally ill patient.65
Interest groups challenged the ODWDA in a 1997 special election, but
voters upheld the provision.6 6

the citizens is more dangerous even than devolving too much authority to the remote central
power.
58 See, e.g., Orde Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation,and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the

Police, 91 IOWA L. REv. 1449, 1490-92 (2006) (evaluating the impact of Raich on California
agencies); Dean A. Strang, Felons, Guns, and the Limits of FederalPower, 39 J. MARSHALL
L. REv. 385, 403-11 (2006) (noting the extension of "commercial activity" in Raich expands
the reach of federal agency power).
59 Nowhere in the text of the CSA does Congress give explicit permission to the Attorney
General to treat marijuana differently than any other drug. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000 & Supp.
II).
" 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
61 Alexander Morgan Capron, Sledding in Oregon: Assisted Suicide Bill, 25-1 HASTINGS
CENT. REP. 34 (Jan. 1995).
62 OR. REv. STAT. § 127.800-97 (2005).
63 Death with Dignity Act: About Us, http://egov.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/aboutus.shtml (last visited Nov. 17, 2006).
64 § 127.800, 805 (2005).
65 Id. § 885.
66 Voters Guide: Oregon Ballot Measure 5 1, http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov497/
voters.guide/M5 1/M51.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2006).
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The provision remained in effect despite calls from Republican
senators for federal intervention.67 When John Ashcroft became the
Attorney General in 2001, he promptly issued an Interpretive Rule that
criminalized assisted suicide using drugs covered under the CSA.68 The
Interpretive Rule stated that physician-assisted suicide did not serve a
legitimate medical purpose, and that a physician's use of drugs covered by
the CSA to facilitate suicide constituted a crime under the CSA.69 Violation
of the CSA is a criminal offense, often a felony. 70
Shortly after the Attorney General's ruling, a group of Oregon
residents composed of a doctor, a pharmacist, and several terminally ill
patients challenged the Interpretive Rule in the U.S. District Court of
Oregon.7' In the initial trial, the district court agreed with the plaintiffs and
issued a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the Attorney
General's ruling.72 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of
the district court.7 3
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard the case in late 2005. 74
The State of Oregon argued that it had historically regulated the practice of
medicine within the state, and that the Attorney General had no authority to
intervene simply because physician-assisted suicide was involved. 75 The
State went on to argue that Congress had not intended to provide the
Attorney General with such sweeping power to interfere with state medical
regulations.76

67

Jim Barnett & Dave Hogan, Senator Drops Effort to Block Suicide Law, OREGONIAN,

Oct. 15, 1998, at A01.
68 66 C.F.R. § 1306 (2001).
69 The Interpretive Rule states:
For the reasons set forth in the OLC Opinion, I hereby determine that assisting suicide is not a
"legitimate medical purpose" within the meaning of 21 CFR § 1306.04 (2001), and that
prescribing, dispensing, or administering federally controlled substances to assist suicide violates
the CSA. Such conduct by a physician registered to dispense controlled substances may "render
his registration ... inconsistent with the public interest" and therefore subject to possible
suspension or revocation under 21 U.S.C. [§] 824(a)(4).

Id.

70 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000 & Supp. II).
71

Complaint at 1, Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Or. 2002) (No. CV 01-

1647-JO).
72 Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1084 (D. Or. 2002).
73 Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004).
74 Gonzales v. Oregon, 543 U.S. 1145 (2005).
75 See Brief of Respondent State of Oregon at 27-28, Gonzales v. Oregon, No. 04-623
(July 20, 2005).
76 Id.
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The Attorney General argued that the Court should defer to the
Interpretive Rule as long as it was a reasonable interpretation of the CSA.77
He also argued that under the doctrine laid out in Auer,78 the Interpretive
Rule should be given deference. The Attorney General went on to suggest
that, per Mead,7 9 Congress had delegated this sort of power to the agency,
and that the agency had acted in accordance with the delegated authority.
Thus, the agency ruling satisfied Chevron Step Zero and should be provided
with broad deference. 8 °
Justice Kennedy wrote the 6-3 majority opinion for the Court,8' which
ruled in favor of the State of Oregon and struck down the Attorney
General's Interpretive Rule as beyond the scope of the power delegated by
Congress.82 The Court first discussed the issue of Auer deference and
concluded that the Interpretive Rule "just repeats [some] phrases and
Because the Rule was only
attempts 'to84 summarize... others. 83
"parroting
an already existing regulation, the Interpretive Rule added
nothing to the statutory language and thus was not entitled Auer
deference.85
The Court subsequently turned to the question of Chevron deference.
The Court granted that the phrase "legitimate medical purpose," outlined in
the CSA, lacked clarity,86 but noted that "Chevron deference ... is not
accorded merely because the statute is ambiguous ....[T]he rule must be
promulgated pursuant to authority Congress has delegated to the official. 8 7
The Court then examined the statutory language relating to "control" of a

77Reply Brief of Petitioner at 11, Gonzales v. Oregon, No. 04-623 (Aug. 25, 2005).
78 519 U.S. 452 (1997); see supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
79533 U.S. 218 (2001).
80For further information about Chevron Step Zero, see supra note 42.
81 Justices Kennedy, Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer composed the
majority. Justice O'Connor was part of the majority even though she had announced her
retirement in July of 2005, pending confirmation of her successor. Justice Alito had not yet
been confirmed when the Court handed down its judgment.
82 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269 (2006).
83 Id. at 257.
84 Id.

85 The Court provided an additional reason for not granting Auer deference to the
Interpretive Rule when it noted that "the current interpretation runs counter to the intent at
the time of the regulation's promulgation." Id. (citations omitted).
86 Id. at 258.
87 Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)); see also 21
U.S.C. § 821 (2004) ("The Attorney General is authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations and to charge reasonable fees relating to the registration and control of the
manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of controlled substances and to listed chemicals.").
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substance and determined that
the Attorney General's actions could not fit
88
within the text of the statute.
The Court continued by examining the registration provisions of the
CSA. In so doing, it noted that the Interpretive Rule "d[id] not undertake
89
the five-factor analysis ...and it concerns much more than registration."
The Court clarified that the Interpretive Rule was not an interpretation of
the registration provision of § 823(0, but rather an interpretation of
substantive federal law. 90 By interpreting substantive federal law, the
Attorney General overstepped the limits given to him by Congress. The
Court pointed out that, following the logic advanced by the Attorney
General, any action deemed an illegitimate medical purpose by the Attorney
General would subject registered physicians to the risk of being branded
felons. 91 "This power to criminalize... would be unrestrained., 92 Clearly,
Congress did not intend to create such unrestrained power when it
promulgated the CSA.
After dismissing both Auer and Chevron deference arguments, the
Court determined that the Attorney General's Interpretive Rule was only
entitled Skidmore deference. 93 The Court noted that state governments, not
94
the federal government, have traditionally regulated the medical field.
Further, the Court stated, "[i]n the face of the CSA's silence on the practice
of medicine generally and its recognition of state regulation of the medical
profession it is difficult to defend the Attorney General's declaration that
the statute impliedly criminalizes physician-assisted suicide." 95 The Court
thus rejected the Attorney General's position and decided in favor of the
Respondents.

88

Id. at 259. ("As is evident from these sections, Congress did not delegate to the

Attorney General authority to carry out or effect all provisions of the CSA. Rather, he can
promulgate rules relating only to 'registration' and 'control,' and 'for the efficient execution
of his functions' under the statute.") (citations omitted). See 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000).
89 Oregon, 546 U.S. at 261. The five-factor analysis included in the CSA is outlined in
21 U.S.C. § 823(f). Id.at 251.
90

Id. at 261.

91 Id.

92 Id.at 262.
93 Id. at 268.

Skidmore deference is such that "[t]he weight of... a judgment in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
94 Oregon, 546 U.S. at 270-71.
9' Id.at 272.
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Under the CSA, Congress delegated to the Attorney General the power
only to reschedule substances or to classify them into schedules.96
Congress did not, however, intend to give the Attorney General carte
blanche to create regulations that preempted state law in arenas traditionally
reserved to the states.97 The Court stated that "[e]ven if 'control' ... were
understood to signify something other than its statutory definition, it would
not support the Interpretive Rule," 98 which went far beyond the bounds
intended by Congress.
The Court noted that Congress went to great lengths to outline the
Attorney General's limited authority to classify or reclassify controlled
substances. 99 This attention to detail stood in contradistinction to the
argument proposed by the Attorney General that would have granted him
wide-ranging power 00 to "declare an entire class of activity outside 'the
course, , of
professional practice,' and therefore a criminal violation of the
CSA. 1o1
In short, while the Attorney General could, with the help of the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, schedule and reschedule drugs
within the ambit of the CSA, 10 2 he overstepped his bounds by issuing an
interpretive rule to define a "legitimate medical purpose" or "professional
practice," both realms for state regulation. 10 3 The Attorney General can
decide "compliance" with the law, but cannot determine substantive

96

Id.

97 Id. at 272.

Under the CSA, the Attorney General can only classify and categorize
drugs onto various schedules. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000).
98 Oregon, 546 U.S. at 260.
99See id. at 260 (citations omitted):
To exercise his scheduling power, the Attorney General must follow a detailed set of procedures,
including requesting a scientific and medical evaluation from the Secretary. The statute is also
specific as to the manner in which the Attorney General must exercise this authority: "Rules of
the Attorney General under this subsection [regarding scheduling] shall be made on the record
after opportunity for a hearing pursuant to the rulemaking procedures prescribed by [the
Administrative Procedure Act]. The Interpretive Rule now under consideration does not concern
the scheduling of substances and was not issued after the required procedures for rules regarding
scheduling, so it cannot fall under the Attorney General's "control" authority.
100Congress did include a blanket provision to enable the Attorney General to carry out
his duties, but the Court ruled that Congress did not intend to create unrestrained
criminalization powers. See 21 U.S.C. § 871(b) (2000 ed. & Supp. II) ("The Attorney
General may promulgate and enforce any rules, regulations, and procedures which he may
deem necessary and appropriate for the efficient execution of his functions under this title.").
101 Oregon, 546 U.S. at 262 (citing Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.,
411 U.S. 726, 744 (1973)).
102 Id. at 265.
103 Id. at 273.
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the law. Congress alone can determine substantive portions of
portions 10of
4
the law.
D. DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN OREGON AND RAICH
Upon superficial examination, the Court's positions in Oregon and
Raich appear inconsistent. On the one hand, Raich suggests that the
Attorney General can use the CSA to preempt state law to establish a
criminal regulatory scheme. 10 5 On the other hand, the Court struck down a
similar scheme in Oregon. In Oregon, the Court held that the Attorney
General could not use the power of the CSA to preempt state106law to
criminalize certain behaviors generally regulated by state agencies.
The discrepancies become even more apparent when examining how
each Justice voted in Oregon and Raich. These votes are summarized in a
table below:
Table 1
Voting on the Scope of Attorney GeneralPower
Gonzales v. Raich

0

7

10
Gonzales v. Oregon

Justice

2005

2006

Stevens
Kennedy

Broad
Broad

Narrow
Narrow

Souter

Broad

Narrow

Ginsburg
Breyer

Broad
Broad

Narrow
Narrow

Scalia

Broad

Broad

O'Connor

Narrow

Narrow

Thomas

Narrow

Broad

Rehnquist

Narrow

Roberts

8

Broad

104 Id. at 263; see also James Cummings, "You're Telling Me?" Federalism'sRole in the
Physician-AssistedSuicide Debate: Gonzales v. Oregon, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. SPECIAL
Supp. 10 (2006) (foreshadowing the impact that federalism would have on the criminal law
issue here).
105 See supra text accompanying notes 49-59.
106 See supra text accompanying notes 60-104.
107 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
'0' 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
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As demonstrated by Table 1, a majority of the Justices changed their
minds regarding the proper reach of the Attorney General's power between
Raich and Oregon. In Raich, Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Scalia all voted to provide the Attorney General with broad
10 9
power to enforce the CSA in preemption of a state regulatory scheme.
Yet in Oregon, Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and
O'Connor all voted to limit the scope of the power of the Attorney General
to preempt state law by utilizing federal regulatory power to criminalize
certain behaviors under the CSA. 11 ° Only Justices Scalia and O'Connor,
both members of the "States' Rights Five,""' voted consistently. Justice12
Scalia voted both times to grant broad power to the Attorney General,"
while Justice O'Connor twice voted to limit the power of the Attorney
General to preempt state law under the CSA.113 An adequate reconciliation
of these outcomes must not only be explanative of past behavior but also
predictive of future behavior by the Court.
E. WHY DOES OREGON MATTER?
As one of the primary cases addressing the scope of agencies' power
to criminalize behavior, Oregon is poised to have far-reaching effects.
Central to American democracy is a distrust of far-ranging criminal powers
vested in a sovereign. 1 4 Oregon directly addresses the agencies' ability to
criminalize certain behaviors. Consequently, any evaluation of Oregon
109 See supra Table 1.
110

Id.

11 The "States' Rights Five" are the late Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. See Lynn A. Baker, The Future of Federalism?: Pierce
County v. Guillen as a Case Study, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 699, 700, n.4 (2005-2006);
Editorial, Fiddling with Federalism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1999, at A34 (referring to the
"States' Rights Five"). The "States' Rights Five" have supported limiting the federal
government's influence over states. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Justice O'Connor has since stepped
down from the Supreme Court and has been replaced by Samuel Alito; John Roberts now
presides as Chief Justice.
112 Justice Scalia has been very consistent on agency deference questions. See, e.g.,
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 35, at 860 ("Justice Scalia invokes Chevron more
consistently than other Justices, but also ends up deferring to agency views less than other
Justices.").
113 See supra Table 1.
114 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; Edward H. Levi,
Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 374 (1976); Daniel C.
Richman, Federal Criminal Law, CongressionalDelegation, and Enforcement Discretion,
46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 765-66 (1999) (arguing that the purpose of requiring crimes to be
defined by Congress is to "make evident the behaviors that are immune from the onerous
intrusions of the state" (quoting FRANCES A. ALLEN, THE HABITS OF LEGALITY: CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW, 77-93 (1996))).
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must consider the tension between administrative efficiency, with agencies
acting within their expertise to dispense justice, and concerns about an
unelected body setting far-reaching criminal standards.1 15 As one scholar
has put it:
It is a familiar premise that the Constitution separates legislative, executive, and
judicial power to prevent tyranny and protect liberty. By preventing any one branch
from accumulating too much authority, the separation of powers aims "not to promote
efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power." The price of separation is
that it makes it more difficult for the federal government to act-whether for good or
bad purposes. The rise of the administrative state put a spotlight on this cost of the
separation of powers. 116

Criminal sanctions hold a special place in the American political
system; the Framers of the Constitution explicitly detailed provisions 1to
17
protect people from sovereigns enacting unjust criminal penalties.
Excesses of the British agents in the colonies no doubt resulted in a
backlash against vesting too much power in an unelected body." l8 As a
result of this initial skepticism, non-statutory criminal law has experienced
an uneasy history in the United States.1 19 After several early cases denied
agencies the freedom to criminalize behaviors outside of clear statutory
guidelines, 120 United States v. Grimaud12 ' provided agencies more leeway
in enforcing criminal penalties. In Grimaud, a Congressional statute
defined both the crime of illegal grazing on a forest reserve and the

115 See Mark D. Alexander, IncreasedJudicialScrutinyfor the Administrative Crime, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 612, 622-24 (1992); see also Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Federal Criminal
"Code" Is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
643, 657-59 (2006) (evaluating the problem of guilt without intent by means of criminalized
regulatory statutes).
116 Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REv.
989, 990-91 (2006) (citations omitted).
117 The most salient examples of these protections are found in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, with provisions addressing the requirement of a grand jury, double jeopardy,
self-incrimination, due process, the right to a jury, and the right to counsel. See also id.
(elaborating on the importance of criminal law to the Framers).
118 Levi, supra note 114, at 374.
119 See, e.g., Ben Rosenberg, The Growth of Federal Criminal Common Law, 29 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 193, 194 (2002) ("That all federal criminal law derives from statutes is a
cornerstone of federal criminal jurisprudence ....
[Extra-statutorial crimes] run afoul of our
deepest notions of due process and raise the specter of the judiciary imposing its
will ... against the citizens.").
120 See, e.g., In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526 (1896) (allowing an agency to enforce a
criminal penalty when the statute the agency administered clearly called for criminal
sanctions); United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677 (1891) (holding that a violation of a
regulation cannot make one liable for a criminal penalty in the absence of a statute distinctly
making the violation a criminal offense).
121220 U.S. 506 (1911).
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appropriate punishment, but left the determination of off-limit properties to
the Secretary of Agriculture. 122 The defendants were indicted for permitting
their sheep to graze on a forest reserve without first obtaining permission
from the Secretary of Agriculture. 123 The Court upheld the criminal
penalties and noted that the
agency merely carried out the will of Congress
124
statute.
the
by
defined
as
From that inauspicious beginning, agency-made criminal law has
consistently grown over the years with the addition of new agencies and
regulations. 12 Recognizing that statutes can never be perfectly precise,
courts often grant deference to the criminal regulations promulgated by
agencies. 126 Raich exemplifies this approach to agency-made criminal law
because the Court upheld the criminal sanctions enacted by the Attorney
General under the CSA. 127 Oregon, on its surface, goes against this trend
because it28limits the Attorney General's ability to promulgate criminal
penalties. 1

The remainder of this Comment examines possible explanations for
the discrepancy in Oregon and Raich and discusses how Oregon's holding
will affect agency-made criminal law in the future.

122 Forest Reserve Act of 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1103 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 471
(1970)) (repealed 1976).
123 Grimaud,220 U.S. at 514-15.
124 Id. at 522 (citations omitted):

The Secretary of Agriculture could not make rules and regulations for any and every purpose.
As to those here involved, they all relate to matters clearly indicated and authorized by Congress.
The subjects as to which the Secretary can regulate are defined. The lands are set apart as a
forest reserve. He is required to make provision to protect them from depredations and from
harmful uses. He is authorized "to regulate the occupancy and use and to preserve the forests
from destruction." A violation of reasonable rules regulating the use and occupancy of the
property is made a crime, not by the Secretary, but by Congress. The statute, not the Secretary,
fixes the penalty.
125 See, e.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing against deference to agencies' interpretations of criminal law).

See generally

Edmund H. Schwenk, The Administrative Crime, Its Creation and Punishment by
Administrative Agencies, 42 MICH. L. REV. 51 (1943) (providing background on the rise of
agency-made criminal law).
126 See Sanford N. Greenberg, Who Says It's a Crime?: Chevron Deference to Agency

Interpretations of Regulatory Statutes That Create Criminal Liability, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 1,
47(1996).
127 See supra Part II.B.
128 See infra Part II1.B.
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III. INTERPRETING OREGON THROUGH THE LENS OF FEDERALISM

Many scholars have approached the Court's recent federalism
decisions 129 as variations on the "new federalism"' 130 of the Rehnquist
Court.' 3 If Oregon's logic resulted from the interface between states and
the federal government, however, the federalism aspects could play out in
variegated ways. What is clear is the unsettled nature of preemption
doctrine, particularly as it regards the preemption of state law by federal
agencies. 132 The ability of agencies to preempt state law-particularly in
areas of regulation traditionally reserved to the states, such as medicinehas an unclear history. 133 As such, there exists a struggle to determine the

precise lines upon which the Court rests its preemption doctrine in Oregon.
The state/federal distinctions that emerged from Oregon and Raich
could be drawn in five ways. First, the Court could make a distinction
between the ability of agency-made rules and congressional statutes to
preempt state law. Second, the Court could draw its distinction on the basis
of criminal versus civil penalties inherent in the CSA as compared to other
agency actions. Third, the Court could base its reasoning on matters
requiring explicit congressional approval instead of merely accepting
congressional silence on an issue as tacit approval. Fourth, particularly in
light of Raich, the Oregon ruling could be driven by the Commerce Clause
and economic versus non-economic issues reasoning. A fifth approach has
129This statement refers particularly to Oregon and Raich.
130"New federalism" here refers to the "Rehnquist Revolution," which utilized the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments to limit the reach of the federal government. This approach is akin
to what Justice Brandeis outlined in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country."), exemplified in both United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). See Ann
Althouse, Inside the FederalismCases: Concern About the Federal Courts, 574 ANNALS 132
(2001) (examining the Rehnquist Court's move toward federalism). See generally Rosalie
Berger Levinson, Will the New FederalismBe the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court?, 40 VAL.
U. L. REV. 589 (2006) (discussing the implications of the Rehnquist Court's "new
federalism"); Mark Tushnet, Federalism and the Supreme Court: The 1999 Term: What is
the Supreme Court's New Federalism?, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 927 (2000) (providing
background on "new federalism").
131Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Casefor Clear Statement
Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823 (2005); Ernest Young, State Sovereign Immunity and
the Future of Federalism, 1999 SuP. CT. REV. 1 (1999).
132See Denise Morgan, Introduction:A Tale of (at Least) Two Federalisms, 50 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 615, 620-21 (2005-2006) ("[T]he unsettled state of the Court's preemption
doctrine only adds more confusion to the already muddy picture of Revolution and counterRevolution.").
133See generally Robert Gasaway, The Problem of Federal Preemption: Reformulating
the Black Letter Rules, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 25 (2005).
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federalism actions
been suggested by Ann Althouse, comparing the Court's
134
in "vanguard" states versus those in "laggard" states.
All of these approaches provide a possible distinction upon which the
Court could have based its reasoning in both cases; however, a careful
examination reveals potential problems and inconsistencies.
A. AGENCY-MADE RULES VERSUS CONGRESSIONAL STATUTES
One line of distinction that can be drawn between Raich and Oregon
concerns rules made by an agency that appear to step outside the intended
bounds set by Congress versus regulations that align themselves closely
with the intentions of Congress. Under this explanation, Congress could
pass legislation that preempts state law via the Commerce Clause, but
would not have the ability to create regulations that preempt state
agencies
5
law.

13

A close analysis of Raich lends some credence to this approach. In
Raich, the Court relied on Wickard, 36 which permitted regulation of wheat
because Congress enacted statutes specifically to address wheat prices as
part of a national comprehensive regulatory scheme. 37 Similarly, Congress
enacted the CSA as part of a comprehensive scheme to deal with the
proliferation of drugs and other dangerous substances.' 38 Under this
explanation, when Congress creates a comprehensive scheme to address a
particular issue, the provisions laid out by Congress, and determined to be
necessary to the execution of that scheme, may preempt state law.
This approach seems to explain Oregon as well. Congress clearly did
not pass the CSA to stop physician-assisted suicide; 139 rather, Congress
passed the CSA to address the growing illicit drug problem in the United
States. Thus, under this reading, the Attorney General's actions were not
permissible because he stepped outside the bounds of his authority by
issuing a ruling that used the CSA to serve a function other than that for

134
135

Althouse, supra note 11; see also infra notes 177-87 and accompanying text.
Presumably, this distinction would be even more at issue in fields traditionally

regulated by the states, such as medicine.
136 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
137 Id. at 114-15.
138 See 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000):
(2) The illegal importation, manufacture, distribution, and possession and improper use of
controlled substances have a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and general welfare
of the American people .... (6) Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in
controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic.
139 The statute makes no mention whatsoever of the issue. See id.
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which Congress intended the legislation, an approach that finds textual
support in the decision. 140
While this approach offers an explanation of the discrepancies between
the two cases, it does not provide much indication about how the Court will
decide cases in the future. The breakdown of the Justices in these two cases
indicates that a straightforward textual reading is too simplistic. Justice
Scalia, for example, favored broad authority for the Attorney General in
both cases, while Justice O'Connor voted41 for the opposite-narrow power
for the Attorney General-in both cases.
Thus, while this analysis may provide an accurate explanation of the
Court's decisions on a meta-level, it does not account for the individual
variances in voting behavior. Consequently, a breakdown of agency-made
rules versus congressional statutes may explain superficial reasons given by
the Court for its ruling, but many scholars doubt whether the Justices took142a
strict functionalist approach to interpreting the CSA in these cases.
Rather, one questions whether the opinion in Oregon is simply a
functionalist gloss on a normative opinion. Perhaps the Court had other
reasons to be more amenable to physician-assisted suicide than medical
marijuana. 143 At the very least, simply stating that Congress can preempt
state law where agencies cannot seems to be an oversimplification of the
issues addressed in Raich and Oregon.
In short, this approach provides a strong argument for explaining the
discrepancy in the past but fails to provide suggestions about how the Court
may decide cases in the future.
B. CRIMINAL VERSUS CIVIL PENALTIES
The Court could also draw a line differentiating agencies that enact
criminal sanctions from those that enact civil penalties. Under this
approach, an agency can abrogate the wall of federalism and preempt state
legislation to regulate civil matters, but it will have less room to tread when
enacting criminal sanctions.
140Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255-63 (2006) ("Deference in accordance with
Chevron... is warranted only when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law." (citations omitted)).
141 See supra Table 1. If the decision were based upon a straightforward textual
approach to the CSA, we would expect most of the justices, when confronted with similar
cases, to adopt similar positions. Only Justices Scalia and O'Connor remained consistent
with their votes, suggesting that the rest of the justices are not applying a simple textualist
approach to the cases.
142 That is, the Court would appear to be ascribing fairly mechanical rules to account for
a more politically-motivated normative opinion. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 13 1.
143 In particular, the political leanings of the justices may have provided a reason for
distinguishing between physician-assisted suicide and medical marijuana.

2007]

AGENCY-MADE CRIMINAL LAW

1281

Our nation has a history of heightened requirements for criminal
law. 144 Mindful of this heightened standard, the Court could simply require

more safeguards to prevent agencies from over-criminalizing behaviors not
specifically intended by Congress. One plausible explanation of the Court's
actions thus focuses on the distinction between civil and criminal matters
reached by agency regulations, with courts providing more leeway for
agency civil regulatory actions while constraining the ability of agencies to
45
regulate criminal matters.1
Courts have good reason to be wary of the increase of regulatory
offenses. Over-criminalization by means of regulatory offenses may have
two unintended results. First, it opens the door to the possibility of tyranny,
with an unelected agency free to criminalize behavior not intended by
Congress to be criminalized.146 The public only holds agencies politically
accountable indirectly.147
Moreover, the feedback loop on this
accountability has a significant period of latency. If federal agencies
overstep their bounds, the public must wait four years to create change in
agencies by electing a new President. 48 Because of this delay in political
accountability, courts have good reason to rein in agencies that exercise
power not specifically delegated by Congress. 149
Second, some question the existence of moral blame that attaches to a
regulatory violation. 50 By criminalizing activities that appear not to carry

144See supra text accompanying notes 114-24.

See Oregon, 546 U.S. at 258-59 (expressing concern at the extent of power available
to the Attorney General to criminalize behaviors under the argument presented by the U.S.
government).
146Alexander, supra note 115, at 624.
147Id. at 627; see also Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
145

864-65 (1984); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 35, at 861; Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative
Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 205,
209-10 (1997) (focusing on the problems inherent to the delegation of power to states
through federal agencies).
148 Or, in the alternative, Congress may act to rein in an overly zealous agency. The lag
time in the political process may make this approach difficult in practice. See, e.g., George
D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption?-MailFraud,State Law, and Post-Lopez
Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 225, 280 (1997) (discussing the slow political process
inherent in the federalist system); Donald L. Doemberg, "We the People": John Locke,
Collective ConstitutionalRights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 52, 99-100 & n.315 (1985) (arguing that Congress is too slow in making constitutional
decisions).
149 Alexander, supra note 115, at 625-28.
150 See Mark A. Edwards, Law and the Parametersof Acceptable Deviance, 97 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 72-73 (2006) (citing TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 25
(1990)) (analyzing the role that normative public opinion plays in determining proper levels
of regulatory enforcement); Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a
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much moral weight, the overall public perception of the legitimacy of the
state criminal law regime may be weakened.' 51 As Lawrence Friedman
notes, "[t]here are vast differences among regulatory crimes in their moral
status within society. There is a huge gulf between what people feel about a
corporation that pours tons of poison into a river and how they feel about
someone who pulls the tag off a mattress., 152 The regulation and
criminalization of trivial acts may lessen the overall legitimacy of the
criminal justice regime. Furthermore, it may also impact the legitimacy of
the agency creating and enforcing such regulations. Thus, courts often have
very good reasons to limit the amount of freedom agencies have in trying to
step outside the bounds delimited for them by Congress.
This reading, however, lacks plausibility because it does not align with
agency behavior in general. Under the auspices of other statutes, agencies
such as the Environmental Protection Agency have long preempted state
law to criminalize certain behaviors. 5 3 Additionally, the Attorney General,
under RICO, has broad powers to promulgate criminal provisions that are
not explicitly authorized by Congress. 154 The existence of agencies with
such wide-ranging criminalization powers casts doubt on a reading of
Oregon and Raich that draws the distinction for the CSA along criminal
versus civil lines.
Even more importantly, the Court previously addressed the Attorney
General's power under the CSA to criminalize certain activities in
preemption of state law. In United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers'
Cooperative,'55 a California voter initiative allowed state citizens to grow
and distribute marijuana for medical necessity. 156 The Attorney General
ordered the Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative ("OCBC") to stop
distributing marijuana in violation
of the CSA. 157 The OCBC refused to do
158
so and sought an injunction.

Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY

L.J. 1533, 1545 (1997).
151 See Green, supra note 150, at 1545.
152 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME

AND PUNISHMENT

IN AMERICAN HISTORY

285

(1993).
153See generally Judson W. Starr, Turbulent Times at Justice and EPA: The Origins of

Environmental CriminalProsecutionsand the Work That Remains, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
900 (1991); James M. Strock, Environmental CriminalEnforcement Prioritiesfor the 1990s,
59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 916 (1991).
114 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006); see infra Part V.B.
155532 U.S.483 (2001).
156 Id. at 486.
117Id. at 487-88.
158 Id.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled against the OCBC and noted that
the CSA contained explicit provisions that included marijuana on the list of
controlled substances. 159 The Court noted that no federal common law
1 60
crimes exist; federal crimes must be created by Congressional statute.
The Court also noted that Congress intended to both criminalize the growth
and distribution of marijuana, as well as enable the Attorney General to
oversee the enforcement of the CSA. 16 ' Thus, the Supreme Court permitted
an agency to enforce criminal provisions specifically pertaining to the CSA.
Even though our system of law has long held that distinctions exist
between civil and criminal penalties, this explanation fails to serve as a
valid explanation for the Court's reasoning in Oregon and Raich. To
acknowledge this distinction as the basis for the Court's reasoning is to
overlook the reality that agencies have long had the power to criminalize
through regulatory action; moreover, the Court addressed the issue of
agency-made criminal law under the CSA in Oakland and came down on
the side of the agency. In sum, past history of agency regulatory powers as
well as previous opinions of the Supreme Court make clear that a
distinction drawn on criminal versus civil lines fails to explain the apparent
discrepancy between Oregon and Raich.
C. EXPLICIT CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL VERSUS CONGRESSIONAL
SILENCE
A third possible basis for the Court's discrepant decisions in Oregon
and Raich lies in the difference between explicit congressional approval of
an agency's actions versus congressional silence on an issue. Under this
paradigm, while an agency may not have power to create regulations that
preempt state law in the face of congressional silence, Congress could
explicitly empower an agency162 to create regulations that abrogate state
law. 163
This explanation would suggest that the differentiation between
Oregon and Raich lies in the extent to which Congress addressed the issues

' Id. at 491.
160 Id. at 490.
161 Id.

at 492-93.

162 For

example, Congress could issue clear-statement rules to guide an agency in

express preemption. See generally Merrill, supra note 131.
163 A significant amount of material has been written about regulatory preemption and

the issues involved.

See, e.g., Jack W. Campbell IV, Regulatory Preemption in the
Garcia/Chevron Era, 59 U. Prr. L. REV. 805 (1998); Lior Evan, Note, Regulatory
Preemption and Federal Common Law: The Post-Sale Enforceability of Farmers Home
Administrative Liens, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1362 (1988); Andrew T. Reardon, Note, An
Examination of Recent Preemption Issues in Banking Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 347 (2004).
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in both cases. In Raich, Congress included marijuana in the CSA
specifically to limit its use and propagation. 164 In Oregon, however,
165
Congress did not even address the issue of physician-assisted suicide.
This paradigm suggests that agencies could trump federalism constraints
where Congress spoke to the issue at hand, but could not act in the face of
congressional silence.
While this paradigm could serve as an explanation for the Court's
reasoning, it fails a "common sense" test; the intention behind the creation
of agencies is to delegate congressional power to the agencies to deal with
66
the minutiae involved with creating comprehensive legal systems.,
Forcing Congress to detail with precision every instance of agency power
defeats the purpose of the administrative state, as that would entail nearly as
67
much work for Congress as passing particular laws to address the issues.'
Agencies should not be required to pause in the face of congressional
silence on issues when they act to fulfill an intelligible principle laid down
by Congress. The inflexibility of the explicit congressional approval versus
congressional silence dichotomy makes it a poor candidate for the Court's
rationale in deciding Oregon and Raich.
D. ECONOMIC VERSUS NON-ECONOMIC FACTORS
Any case discussing the impact of federalism inevitably deals with
Commerce Clause issues. 16 8 The federalism of the Rehnquist Court, in

164

165
166

Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005).
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006).
See, e.g., Brian Galle, The Justice ofAdministration: Judicial Responses to Executive

Claims of Independent Authority to Interpret the Constitution, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 157,

218-19 (2005) (noting that "agencies ... are best equipped to carry out th[e] function [of
governing because] their information... is 'closer to the ground"'). Galle goes on to note
that agencies are "more nimble" than Congress and can react more quickly to changing
circumstances.

Id. at 219.

See also Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts:

MisplacedMetaphors in AdministrativeLaw, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1463, 1497-98 (2000)
(discussing the struggle between legislative supremacy and administrative expediency in the
context of the nondelegation doctrine); Sunstein, supra note 42, at 197 (stating "it would be
appropriate
realities").

for agencies ... to

resolve competing

interests

.. .

in light of everyday

Noah, supra note 166, at 1497-98.
168 For much of the past century, federalism analyses have largely involved discussions
167

of the Commerce Clause and Congress's ability to regulate interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
Diane McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalism after Lopez and
Morrison: The Casefor Closing the Jurisdictional-ElementLoophole, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1675
(2002) (examining recent developments in the approach to interstate commerce after the
Rehnquist Revolution).
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particular, dealt heavily with Commerce Clause concerns. 169 If, as many
suggest, Oregon and Raich are principally federalism cases, 70 it makes
sense to consider whether the distinctions the Court used could be the result
of Commerce Clause analysis.
In evaluating Oregon and Raich, the Court could draw a distinction
based on economic and non-economic factors, an integral part of
72
Commerce Clause analysis.17' In Raich, the Court relied on Wickard,
which pointed out that locally cultivated wheat could have an impact on
interstate commerce. 173 The Court thus concluded that locally cultivated
and distributed medical marijuana could similarly have an effect on
interstate commerce, falling under the ambit of Congress's Commerce
Clause powers. 174 Conversely, physician-assisted suicide in Oregon does
not involve the cultivation or trade of a controlled substance. One could
reason that the Court concluded this activity was non-economic in nature
and therefore outside the reach of Congress's Commerce Clause authority.
This distinction, however, fails to account for several factors. The
physician likely obtained the drugs used to terminate a patient's life through
interstate commerce. 175 At the least, one has a plausible argument that
Oregon deals with economic factors. Additionally, any reading that
attempts to reconcile Oregon and Raich on the grounds of economic and
non-economic factors for Commerce Clause analysis overlooks one glaring
76
problem: While Raich discusses Commerce Clause issues at length,1
Oregon does not even broach the subject; the Court avoids a Commerce
Clause analysis and instead focuses on the reach of the Attorney General's
powers, not on the status of the substance being regulated. 77 It is not clear
that the Oregon Court even considered Commerce Clause issues in
rendering its opinion.
Even though economic and non-economic issues exist in both Raich
and Oregon, the potential to make physician-assisted suicide an economic
factor, as well as the Court's lack of concern over Commerce Clause issues

169 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995).
170 See generally Danino, supra note 9; Huhn, supra note 9; Merrill, supra note 131.
171Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-12; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57.
172 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
173 Id. at 128-29.

174 See supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
175 This interstate commerce could occur either directly or indirectly, as evinced in
Wickard and Raich.

176 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15-19 (2005).
177 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257-65 (2006).
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in Oregon, renders this distinction a non-viable basis for understanding the
Court's decision.
E. VANGUARD STATES VERSUS LAGGARD STATES
A final approach to explain the Oregon and Raich disparity has been
proposed by Ann Althouse.178 Noting the inconsistencies in court rulings
on federalism, 79 Althouse suggests that the Court may have adopted a
Brandeisian1 80 approach to these cases: Viewing the states as experimental
laboratories, the Court sets a floor of liberties to which all states must
adhere, but provides states with the opportunity to raise the bar and provide
more liberties. This argument explains why the liberal bloc 18 ' of the Court
would come down hard on states that lag behind on rights1 82 but would
support83federalism in instances where states are on the vanguard of civil
rights. 1

This approach gains more credence when one examines Kennedy's
concurrence in Lopez, 184 in which he discussed the Court's role in
85
addressing vanguard and laggard issues by means of federalism.
Nevertheless, significant concerns exist with creating a stock dichotomy to
analyze a variety of matters. The Court would need to develop a working
model to determine which state activities constitute the "vanguard" group
and which constitute the "laggard" group. One envisions a scenario in
which the Justices rely more on their own normative evaluations of where
rights should be rather than a strict textualist interpretation of the
Constitution. While the Warren Court certainly embraced this model to
remedy the wrongs it perceived in society, courts that rely on normative

178

179

See Althouse, supra note 11.
Id. at 1751.

180 Id. at 1745.
181The "liberal bloc" of the Court is composed of Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Stevens. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and Criminal Law on the
Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1043 (2006).
182 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (liberal bloc opposes
federalism where Virginia is a laggard on civil rights).
183

See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (liberal bloc supports

federalism where New Jersey is in the vanguard of the civil rights movement).
'" United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
185

See, e.g., id. at 577-79 ("Although it is the obligation of all officers of the

Government to respect the constitutional design, the federal balance is too essential a part of
our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit
inability to intervene when one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too
far." (citations omitted)).
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judgments rather
than textual support run the risk of appearing illegitimate
86
to the public.
Additionally, some Constitutional scholars suggest that a simplistic
paradigm such as the vanguard/laggard approach fails to consider all of the
possible factors weighing in on the Court's decisions. 8 7 Chemerinsky
88
notes that no single theory explains all of the Court's federalism rulings.
While Althouse's vanguard/laggard paradigm may provide a solid
conceptual framework for the Court's approach to federalism in general, the
difficulties in determining the composition of the vanguard/laggard
classifications as well as the over-simplification of the method makes this
model inapplicable to the specific situation of Oregon and Raich.
IV. AN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPROACH TO RECONCILING OREGON AND
RAICH

While federalism certainly played a role in the Court's decisions in
Oregon and Raich, none of these approaches adequately explains why the
Attorney General could criminalize behavior in one instance189 and not in
the other.' 90 Moreover, these approaches fail to predict future decisions of
the Court. Much can be gained by taking the Court's reasoning in Oregon
at face value: In a decision ostensibly about administrative law with an
opinion that extensively discusses administrative law, perhaps the first
place to which one should turn to understand the Court's reasoning is
administrative law. The remainder of this Comment argues that even
though federalism concerns exist in Oregon, administrative law doctrines
provide the most insight into reconciling Oregon and Raich. Moreover, a
186 See, e.g., Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some
Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169, 236-41 (1968)
(citations omitted):
Insofar as the Court also has a symbolic role to play in our society, however, it too is subject to
the mandate of establishing, declaring, and appearing to live in accordance with, standards that
are not of this world. In the case of the Court, those standards require the maintenance of an
appearance not only of incorruptibility-which the society largely, and correctly, takes for
granted-but also of adherence to principle, to logic, and to neutrality.

See also Edwards, supra note 150, at 83; David A. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor,
100 HARV. L. REv. 731 (1984) (evaluating the impact that judicial candor has on the public
perception of court legitimacy); David A. Strauss, Reply: Legitimacy and Obedience, 118

HARV. L. REv. 1854, 1857-58 (2005) (discussing the public perception of the illegitimacy of
Bush v. Gore because the Court relied on normative judgments rather than legal precedent).
187 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Reconceptualizing Federalism, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 729,
731 (2005-2006).
188 Id.
189 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
190 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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synthesized administrative law and federalism reading of Oregon provides a
helpful framework by which to predict future decisions of the Court.
A. FEDERALISM AND INCIDENTAL CRIMINALIZATION POWERS

While many scholars see Oregon and Raich as federalism cases within
the ambit of the traditional Rehnquist era approach, an administrative law
reading clarifies the federalism differences presented by the two cases.
Raich was a challenge to the constitutionality of the CSA under the
Commerce Clause, 91 not a challenge to the reach of the Attorney General's
powers. As such, the power to criminalize in Raich is only incidental to the
power to categorize drugs into the schedules outlined by the CSA.1 92 This
categorization of drugs is the legitimate role of the Attorney General, which
was not challenged in the case. No assertion was made in Raich that the
Attorney General lacked the power to categorize.
The federalism issues in Oregon lie in contradistinction to those in
Raich. In Oregon, the constitutionality of the CSA as a whole is assumed.
The case focuses on more than the authority to criminalize that arises from
the power to categorize. 193 Rather, the State of Oregon argued that the
power to determine "legitimate medical purpose" has substantive
1 94
criminalizing effects apart from the power merely to categorize.
Thus, while Raich and Oregon both address federalism concerns under
the CSA, the cases deal with different issues. An administrative law
reading of Oregon supplements the conventional federalism approach to
reconciling the cases.
B. READING OREGON FOR WHAT IT SAYS
A facial reading of Oregon suggests that the case involves more than
just federalism. 195 In particular, Oregon is best understood as the Court's
attempt to flesh out the intersection between federalism and administrative
law. The majority opinion never discusses federalism concerns and only
briefly touches on the preemption provisions of the CSA. 196 Oregon
191

Id. at 5.

192 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000).
193 Oregon, 546 U.S. at 247-50.
194 Id. at 286.

195 This is a common theme in cases involving regulatory preemption. Justice Scalia, in
particular, has pointed out that the invocation of federalism in regulatory preemption cases
obfuscates issues that do not primarily involve federalism. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378-79 n.6 (1999). But see Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign
Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 39-42 (arguing that Iowa
Utils. was actually the most important federalism case of the Supreme Court term).
196 Oregon, 546 U.S. at 270-72.
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revolves around the Supreme Court's setting of strict limits on the Attorney
General's power to criminalize behaviors without clear authorization from
Congress. Applied to agencies generally, the holding in Oregon indicates
that when agencies step into areas traditionally regulated by the states, 197
the agencies may only criminalize actions to the extent that Congress
plainly authorized such regulations by statute. In areas where the federal
government has not traditionally been involved, agencies must tread
pass must come
carefully when preempting state law; the regulations they
98
from clear federal authority to pass Chevron Step Zero.'
Viewed in another light, Oregon ushers in a broad reading of Mead.1 99
The Court makes clear that it will only defer to an agency's interpretation of
law where: (1) Congress gives evidence that it intended the agency to make
rules that have the force of law; and (2) the agency has actually made rules
consistent with the intention of Congress.
Thus, Oregon applies the Mead doctrine to the realm of regulatory
preemption. Raich laid out guidelines for implied preemption, with
agencies able to preempt state law when part of a comprehensive federal
scheme. 200 But Oregon interprets Mead to deal with express regulatory
preemption; if Congress desires for agency regulations to preempt state law,
Congress must clearly state its intention. If such authorization is not clear
and if Congress did not intend to create a comprehensive regulatory
scheme, Oregon provides courts with guidance to limit agencies' ability to
criminalize behavior through regulatory means.
This explanation of the Court's decision fundamentally changes the
nature of Chevron analysis. Moving forward, courts have license to review
agency actions more aggressively before granting them Chevron deference.
On the whole, this intuitively seems like a good move: Pre-Oregon, as
evinced by Raich, courts almost always upheld agency actions that made it
through the Chevron gate.20 1 Oregon does not change the nature of cases
that are granted Chevron deference. It does, however, make it more
difficult for agencies to obtain that deference by aggressively reviewing
their actions and insisting that the agency, particularly in matters of
criminal law, only act within the limits of authority explicitly provided by
congressional statute.
Nevertheless, Oregon reaffirms that agency deference is not an "all or
nothing" approach. If a court does not grant an agency Chevron deference,
197 For example, both the medical profession and tort law have been largely controlled by

the individual states.
198See Merrill, supra note 131; Sunstein, supra note 42.
199 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
200 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
201 See generally Merrill & Hickman, supra note 35.
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that agency still maintains some right to deference. Specifically, Oregon
clarifies that agencies not granted Chevron deference can still receive
persuasive Skidmore deference. In the future, the Court can rely on the
administrative doctrines outlined in Oregon as it evaluates regulatory
preemption cases.
V. POTENTIAL ISSUES WITH AN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPROACH TO
GONZALES V. OREGON

Several potential issues arise from an administrative law explanation to
the Court's ruling in Oregon. In particular, one must determine if an
administrative law approach passes the "common sense" test; if so, does the
approach really solve anything or shed light on "new federalism"?
Moreover, will lesser deference accorded to agency actions impact the War
on Terror?
A. THE "COMMON SENSE" TEST

The primary difficulty in determining how the Court decided Oregon
lies not in Oregon itself but in its comparison to Raich. Simply put, does an
administrative law explanation properly account for the voting
discrepancies between Oregon and Raich? To be a valid understanding of
the Court's decision, this approach must provide a common-sense
explanation of the two cases.
Analyzing Oregon, there is apparent irony in the liberal bloc of the
Court sticking closely to the Constitution to permit federalism, while the
traditional federalists on the Court sided with governmental authority,
apparently utilizing a normative or functionalist approach 22 By focusing
entirely on federalism, these discrepancies are difficult to reconcile without
adopting a cynical, politics-driven approach to Court decision-making.2 0 3 If
Oregon, however, turns on questions of administrative law, the Justices'
positions on federalism pale.20 4 Using an administrative law approach, the
Court has the flexibility to decide difficult cases without resorting to the
overly politicized battleground of federalism.
B. OREGON'S HOLDING APPLIED TO RICO AND THE WAR ON TERROR
The tightening of agency-made criminal law evinced by the Court in
Oregon may affect the Attorney General's ability to promulgate effective
202 See supra Table 1.

203 Strauss, supra note 186, at 1857-58 (noting that decisions apparently driven by

political concerns undermine the legal and moral authority of the Court).
204 But see Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 300-01 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(noting federalism issues involved with reconciling Raich and Oregon).
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criminal regulations under RICO 20 5 when attempting to deal with the War

on Terror. Congress passed RICO in response to growing organized crime
in the United States. 206 Under the Oregon holding, because Congress did
not pass RICO to deal with international terrorism, the Attorney General
may not be able to utilize RICO to deal with terrorism concerns.20 7
RICO criminalizes conduct constituting a pattern of racketeering
offenses if they are committed in conjunction with a criminal enterprise. 208
Four elements must be proved to establish a RICO claim: (1) the presence
of a defendant "person," (2) an "enterprise," (3) and a "pattern" of (4)
"racketeering" acts. 20 9 A U.S. Attorney is able to charge defendants under
RICO if they have committed any two of thirty-five crimes within a tenyear period.2t0 Criminal provisions of RICO create penalties ranging to a
maximum of twenty years imprisonment, fines of up to $250,000 per
offense for individuals, fines of up to $500,000 per offense for
organizations, and forfeiture to the United States
government of all property
2 11
activity.
illegal
the
from
derived
and proceeds
The difficulty of applying RICO to international terrorism lies in the
definitions inherent to the statute. To use RICO's provisions against
terrorists, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") must show that the terrorists
205 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
206 Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922:
The Congress finds that (I) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated,
diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's
economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption ... and (5)
organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the
law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal
and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily
limited in scope and impact.
207 RICO, originally devised to combat organized crime, has rarely been used to deal
with terrorism. See Nathan & Juster, supra note 16, at 560. RICO has both civil and
criminal provisions and enables the government to take wide-ranging actions to combat
criminal organizations. The primary recent case involving the application of RICO in the
War on Terror occurred when victims of the September 11, 2001 attacks attempted to use
RICO to recover against terrorists and state sponsors of terror. In re Terrorist Attacks on
September 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). See generally Ann Althouse,
Our New Federalism? National Authority and Local Autonomy in the War on Terror: The
Vigor ofAnti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1231 (2004)
(discussing federalism issues involved with the War on Terror).
208 Sarah Baumgartel, The Crime of Associating with Criminals? An Argument for
Extending the Reves "Operationor Management" Test to RICO Conspiracy, 97 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1, 5 (2006).
209 18 U.S.C. § 1962; Baumgartel, supra note 208, at 5.
210 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
211 Id. at § 1963(a); see Nathan & Juster, supra note 16, at 564 n.67.
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form part of a particular criminal "enterprise., 21 2 As one scholar notes,
applying RICO to the War on Terror "presents [RICO's] most innovative
face, and its most significant challenge to orthodox notions of criminal law,
procedure, and evidence. 2 13
The seminal case dealing with criminal enterprise in the context of
terrorism is Doe I v. State of Israel.214 In State of Israel, the plaintiffs, who
owned land in the West Bank, alleged that soldiers of the defendant State of
Israel pointed guns at them, threatened to shoot them if they did not leave,
215
The Court
set fire to their property, and destroyed their olive groves.
showed
never
plaintiffs
the
decided in favor of the defendant, noting that
how the defendant was an organized enterprise with a shared decisionmaking infrastructure.21 6 Merely alleging a pattern of abuse by various
loosely related groups did not meet the standard of criminal enterprise in
RICO; a higher standard exists to prove enterprise.2 17
Under an administrative law approach to Oregon, the State of Israel
holding could create problems for the DOJ as it attempts to utilize RICO in
the War on Terror. Because terror cells are loosely affiliated, if at all, it
may be difficult for the DOJ to show that these cells meet levels of
infrastructure required to prove the existence of a criminal enterprise. Since
criminal enterprise must be established for the DOJ to use RICO, the
inapplicability of the term "criminal enterprise" applied to loosely affiliated
terror cells may disrupt the DOJ's ability to proceed. As such, the War on
Terror does not fall within the strict statutory language of RICO.
212 18 U.S.C.

§

1962(b)-(c).

"[Elnterprise includes any individual, partnership,

corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity." Id. at § 1961(4).
213 Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal,87 COLUM. L. REV. 920, 932
(1987); see also Teresa Bryan, Kyle Cohen, C.J. Eaton & Stephen Love, Racketeer Influence
and Corrupt Organizations, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 987, 1021-23 (2003) (providing
additional background on RICO criminal provisions).
214 400 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C. 2005).
215 Id. at 99. The plaintiffs filed a 140-page complaint with over 600 paragraphs,
"broadly alleging that plaintiffs, or their loved ones, have been personally and financially
injured by the actions of the Israeli defendants-and those acting under their command or
policies-regarding settlement activities in the West Bank." Id. at 97.
216 Id. at 120.
217 See United States v. Local 560 of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 290 (3d Cir.
1983) (citing United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 221 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 849 (1984)) (holding that the U.S. Attorney must demonstrate "evidence of an ongoing
organization, formal or informal," that the organization's "various associates function as a
continuing unit," and that it exists "separate and apart" from "pattern of activity in which it
engages"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986); Robinson v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 674 F.
Supp. 243 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (commission of felonies by a few persons cannot constitute
"enterprise" where there is no infrastructure between them in support of continuing
relationship).
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An administrative law reading of Oregon requires congressional
authority for an agency to promulgate and enforce criminal penalties against
offenders. With Congress not yet speaking directly to the application of
RICO in the War on Terror, the DOJ may find that courts, acting under the
auspices of Oregon, render the agency less deference in its actions.
VI. CONCLUSION

After shocking federalism scholars with its decision in Gonzales v.
Raich, the Supreme Court backpedaled with its decision in Gonzales v.
Oregon. In Oregon, most of the Justices adopted positions opposite those
they took in Raich. Even though both cases concerned agency-made
criminal law under the CSA, the Court decided each differently. Most
scholars who analyze Oregon and Raich have focused on the federalism
issues, pointing out that the distinction between the two cases can be drawn
along several lines: agency-made rules versus Congress-made rules;
criminal penalties versus civil penalties; explicit congressional approval
versus congressional silence; economic impact versus non-economic
impact; and vanguard states versus laggard states. An analysis of each of
these approaches has shown how each fails to account for the discrepancies.
This Comment puts forward a new approach. Rather than focusing
solely on federalism, Oregon is best read as an administrative law case that
limits agencies' power to expand criminal regulatory provisions without
clear statutory authority from Congress. Reading Oregon in this light,
however, puts pressure on the DOJ as it attempts to deal with the War on
Terror and yet still stay within the explicit statutory guidelines of RICO.
The Oregon holding represents a new shift in criminal law, away from
agency-made provisions and back toward increased congressional
oversight.
Oregon sends a strong signal that agencies should not
criminalize behaviors that are outside the scope of congressional statutory
approval.

1294

TREVOR STILES

[Vol. 97

